The 48th Highlanders in Sicily by Johnston, I.S.
Canadian Military History
Volume 12 | Issue 3 Article 5
4-26-2012
The 48th Highlanders in Sicily
I.S. Johnston
This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
Johnston, I.S. (2003) "The 48th Highlanders in Sicily," Canadian Military History: Vol. 12: Iss. 3, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol12/iss3/5
57© Canadian Military History, Volume 12, Number 3, Summer 2003, pp.57-64.
As far as we are concerned the Sicilian campaign which ended for 1 Canadian 
Division about five or six weeks ago, commenced 
on Easter Sunday, 25 April 1943, when our 
Church Parade was cancelled by Brigade and 
a conference of battalion commanders was 
called. We were warned for special training 
in an unknown place and were told that the 
battalions would revert to the old four rifle 
company establishment and that we would 
generally prepare for operations. Previous to 
this we had already commenced mobilization. 
We then spent another week at EASTBOURNE 
during which time we formed the fourth rifle 
company, disposed of extra equipment, cleared 
out all category men and doubtful physical 
cases, and completely overhauled equipment. 
We then went to INVERARY where we trained on 
Combined Operations without any particular type 
of country in view, for one week. From INVERARY 
we went to AUCHINLECK where we completed 
re-equipment and commenced receiving special 
equipment such as pack saddles, anti-malarial 
equipment, mosquito nets, light bicycles, etc. 
We still had no idea of where we were going. 
While still at AUCHINLECK we sent away all 
men over 40 years of age (about 30) and these 
were replaced by younger reinforcements. It is 
an interesting fact that at that late date we had 
a very large turnover of personnel and received 
quite a number of untrained men. It was at this 
stage that we received our first reinforcements 
most of whom came from other regiments and 
divisions. At AUCHINLECK we took part in 
exercise WETSHOD which involved spending 
five days on board HMS GLENGYLE. During 
this exercise a landing on a shallow beach based 
on actual operations was carried out. After 
WETSHOD I was called to LONDON and briefed 
on the operation which we have just completed. 
Preparations continued in AUCHINLECK and 
about 10 June the first group of troops with 
vehicles were dispatched to LIVERPOOL, 
MANCHESTER and GLASGOW. The battalion 
itself left AUCHINLECK on 13 June after having 
been told that it was going off on an exercise and 
we embarked on M.V. DERBYSHIRE lying in the 
GAIRLOCH on the same day. About five days later 
we participated in Exercise STYMIE I. We laid off 
ARRAN for several days and then returned up the 
RIVER CLYDE to the TAIL OF THE BANK and 
stayed there for about another week. We actually 
set sail for the operation on 28 June. 
During the actual landing the 48 Highlanders 
The 48th Highlanders in Sicily
Account by Lieutenant-Colonel I.S. Johnston, Officer 
Commanding 48 Highlanders given on 14 August 1943 at the 
Battalion Rest Area near SCORDIA
Top left and right: Convoy en route to Sicily by Major 
William Abernethy Ogilvie
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were detailed to act as reserve battalion for 1 CIB. 
At about noon 9 July as we were passing MALTA 
a heavy sea blew up and we doubted whether the 
operation would come off. One company of the 
Hastings & Prince Edward Regiment together 
with 40 Royal Marine Commandos were the 
assault troops and left the DERBYSHIRE on 
time having loaded into landing craft at the davit 
heads. Landing Craft Infantries and Landing 
Craft Assaults then came alongside to take off this 
battalion and certain other troops. Owing to the 
heavy swell these craft had difficulty in coming 
alongside and actually were not fully loaded by 
the time that we were supposed to touch down 
at the beach. However, when we were completely 
loaded we reported to the GLENGYLE at about 
dawn and brigade held us up for about an hour 
before we were ordered in as apparently the 
assaulting battalions had been equally delayed. 
We were ordered to land on ROGER GREEN I 
beach and we directed the Navy on to that point 
and attempted to land on the extreme right of that 
beach but we touched down on the sandbar. We 
were able to pull off this sandbar and attempted 
another landing on the left of ROGER GREEN I 
where we again touched down but again found 
that we were on a reef. We tried to pull ourselves 
off this reef and tried for ROGER RED beach and 
saw that other LCIs were having equal difficulty 
there. We had some strong swimmers carry a 
line into shore for the men to pull themselves 
along but these became fouled with two Landing 
Craft Mechanizeds that had broken down near 
the beach. Eventually we hailed some passing 
LCAs and DUKWs and transferred the troops to 
them and we were carried over the deep water 
to the beach itself. 
There was no small arms fire on the beach during 
all this delay and we saw only two shells land in 
the water anywhere near us. After the landing 
we had a little difficulty correlating the ground 
with our ideas gained from maps, models and 
pictures. We gained our first objective without 
contacting any enemy. Our only difficulty lay in 
crossing the sand dunes with the mortar and 
Vehicles of the 1st Canadian Division being hauled up from the beach near Pachino, Sicily, 10 July 1943.
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wireless handcarts. We remained on our objective 
that night during which we were entertained by 
a fireworks display when the enemy attempted 
to bomb beaches and harbour from the air. 
Intentionally or otherwise they dropped one 
bomb in ‘D’ Company area but without causing 
any casualties. 
On the following day (11 July) we made for 
BURGIO which we reached without encountering 
the enemy and where Lieutenant-General Sir 
Oliver Leese, General Officer Commanding 30 
Corps, paid us a visit. From there we received 
orders to march to ROSOLINI which we entered 
with the Italians who surrendered to the tune 
of 45 PWs. We spent a very uncomfortable 
night in the town due to the town being on fire 
in many places coupled with a horrible stench 
which seemed to pervade everywhere and on 
top of this it had turned quite cold. During 
that same night the Royal Canadian Regiment 
passed through us on vehicles followed by the 
Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment and then 
ourselves leaving at about 0500 hours, 12 July. 
We had no vehicles for this march having loaned 
all of ours to the Royal Canadian Regiment. All 
that day (12 July) we marched to the area of 
MODICA. Our heat casualties during this march 
were severe and we had a very large number of 
stragglers, but we found a fairly cool area with 
water where we rested until about midnight and 
then continued to march on to GIARRATANIA. 
Here we spent the night and the surrounding hills 
to take up positions. Altogether we were in the 
GIARRATANIA area for about three days and it 
was here on 14 July that General Sir Bernard L. 
Montgomery gave his personal talk to the Royal 
Canadian Regiment and 48 Highlanders on a 
combined parade. 
On the night of the 15 July we left GIARRANTANIA 
at about 2400 hours and moved just south of 
VIZZINI where the 51 (Highland) Division had 
been halted. We were thereupon turned off the 
road on orders from the Brigade and rested in a 
field. The following morning (16 July) at first light 
we passed through the 51 (Highland) Division and 
were then in occupation of VIZZINI, preceded by 
the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment. Up 
to this point we had had no fighting, although we 
did have some contact with the Italians who had 
packed up in all cases. It was at VIZZINI that we 
heard for the first time of any troops contacting 
Germans. At the next town, GRAMMICHELE, the 
Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment ran into 
some definite trouble but they were able to clear 
the enemy from the forward reaches of the town 
by 1200 hours. I was called upon by the Brigade 
commander to furnish a recce patrol and carriers 
to enter GRAMMICHELE and see if it was entirely 
cleared of enemy. Since our carriers had gone 
down with the CITY OF VENICE, I borrowed 
German prisoners captured by Canadian troops near Valguarnera, 17 July 1943.
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three carriers from the Brigade Support Group 
(Saskatoon Light Infantry) using their drivers 
under the command of one of our officers, 
Lieutenant McLaughlin, with the balance of the 
crew coming from ‘B’ Company. This patrol was 
to report back by 1400 hours and it did reporting 
the town clear. In the meantime orders had come 
through from the General Officer Commanding of 
the Division to advance by 1400 hours. We did so 
with a section of carriers leading, a squadron of 
tanks from 12 Canadian Tank Regiment (Three 
Rivers Regiment) carrying a company of infantry, 
a platoon of engineers, together with a detachment 
of anti-tank guns and the remainder of battalion 
embussed on motor transport. Because the 
supporting arms had all been involved in the 
Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment’s show, 
we could not get this column moving until 1500 
hours by which time no Forward Observation 
Officers or engineers had reported. We lead off 
with the same three carriers and crews that 
had done the recce. When about two miles out 
of GRAMMICHELE the leading carrier in which 
Lieutenant McLaughlin was riding came across 
a burned-out enemy vehicle which it by-passed, 
thereby touching the soft shoulder at the side of 
the road, passed over an enemy mine and blew 
up. Before the engineers had evidently reported, 
our own pioneers had been sent forward with this 
detachment to deal with further enemy mines. 
They, together with the engineers, who had arrived 
by this time, reported the road cratered ahead 
with probable mines. The battalion thereupon 
debussed and moved across country on either 
side of the road and by sunset were still several 
miles from CALTEGIRONE, our objective. The 
engineers who had been left behind on the road 
then caught up with us and reported no further 
mines, so we went back to the road and moved 
at a much quicker pace. At about 2400 hours we 
were ordered not to enter the town but to bivouac 
on the side of the road. However, at 0200 hours, 
17 July, we received instructions to occupy the 
town before daylight. In the meantime the tanks 
and certain other vehicles had joined us and we 
entered the town of CALTEGIRONE at about 0400 
hours without opposition. That day (17 July) we 
moved on through SAN MICHEL and PIAZZA 
ARMERINA towards VALGUERNERA embussed. 
It must be pointed out that at this stage of the 
campaign transport was very scarce and every 
available vehicle was used to carry troops. When 
the occasion demanded it some rode on anti-tank 
guns, Sherman tanks, even the water-wagon 
and various odd Italian transport which we had 
picked up on the way. This involved bringing 
ammunition and other important supplies 
forward to one dump and leaving as many as 
three to four dumps on the route according to 
the priority of equipment.
South of VALGUERNERA a right flanking 
movement was attempted at which the Royal 
Canadian Regiment and Hastings and Prince 
Edward Regiment fanned well out on the 
high ground to the east of the town. The 48 
Highlanders also moved into the high ground 
about two miles east of the main road where we 
took up position opposite a ridge from which the 
enemy were able to observe our movements and 
position and thereby mortar us. There positions 
had been taken up shortly after dawn (18 July) 
and in the afternoon we were ordered to patrol 
the high ground before us to determine the extent 
of the enemy’s positions. Two platoons from ‘D’ 
Company were sent forward as fighting patrols 
A Canadian patrol makes its way through the streets of Valguarnera, 19 July 1943.
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to this ridge where they found quite a number 
of enemy positions and which they were able to 
attack with considerable success and drove the 
enemy from the area. These two patrols suffered 
comparatively light casualties in these actions. 
While in the VALGUERNERA area we heard that 
ENNA had fallen and that our attack was shifted 
to the axis due north of us. 48 Highlanders were 
ordered to approach ASSORO by the morning of 
19 July across country on either side of the road 
to STAZIONE di DITTAINO, which we did, moving 
on the high ground wherever possible. Along this 
route we encountered minor resistance which we 
overcame without casualties. As we were about to 
wheel to the left on the road to ASSORO we were 
halted and the Royal Canadian Regiment passed 
through us. We then took up position on the high 
ground south of the railway track which runs 
south of ASSORO from west to east. That night 
the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment passed 
through us and entered the town of ASSORO 
where they were cut off. 
The following afternoon (20 July), leaving ‘A’ 
and ‘C’ Companies as a firm base, ‘D’ and ‘B’ 
Companies were sent forward toward ASSORO. 
No.17 platoon came under fire on the right 
of the road after which numbers 16 and 18 
platoons eventually followed by 17 platoon 
found a covered line of approach near the power 
station. By nightfall both companies went out of 
wireless communication but were subsequently 
found to be on top of the hill covering the 
approaches to ASSORO and were brought back 
into communication with each other. At dawn 
(21 July) ‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies were able to 
clear the enemy from this hill thus permitting 
the engineers to fill in a road crater which had 
prevented the supporting arms from getting their 
transport forward. During this operation both 
companies suffered casualties. When the hill 
was cleared ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies and battalion 
headquarters were able to push forward and 
the battalion took up position on the main 
road west of ASSORO where it was mortared 
and shelled by the enemy throughout the day. 
Because of this no supporting arms could reach 
the battalion. By nightfall (21 July) the battalion 
was concentrated and prepared to move forward 
to the road junction north of ASSORO and east of 
LEONFORTE in square 3594. As it prepared to 
leave for this road junction it came under heavy 
shelling and ‘D’ and ‘B’ Companies again suffered 
casualties. After some confusion the battalion 
assembled on the road and moved in the order 
- ‘D’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘A’ Companies. ‘D’ Company 
on reaching the road junction reported it clear 
and ‘B’ Company thereupon moved forward and 
through ‘D’ Company to take up its position. 
When this occurred both companies came under 
heavy machine gun fire. By nightfall (22 July) 
it was difficult to estimate the numbers and 
positions held by the platoons of the enemy and 
there was some confusion as to the positions held 
by the platoons of these companies. Accordingly 
both companies were ordered to withdraw which 
they did reporting the presence of at least three 
tanks in hull down positions and machine guns 
and infantry in the area. During these actions the 
18 sets of both companies had failed. Captain 
Lynn was the last to withdraw from his company 
position and a party of men who went back to find 
him reported that the enemy were withdrawing. 
Accordingly the battalion moved into the area 
and took up its positions at about first light (23 
July). Throughout the day and that night we were 
shelled and mortared in these positions without 
casualties and on the following day (24 July) we 
were relieved by the Edmonton Regiment and 
A Sherman tank from a Canadian armoured regiment moves across a dusty Sicilian plateau, 3 August 1943.
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proceeded on foot behind the Royal Canadian 
Regiment in the direction of NISSORIA. The plan 
was that the Royal Canadian Regiment should 
move with their left flank on the road and the 48 
Highlanders should move astride the road behind 
them. The Royal Canadian Regiment contacted 
the enemy sitting on the ridge east of NISSORIA. 
The 48 Highlanders were ordered into a position 
on the high ground west of this town and that 
night the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment 
were ordered to pass through to take the ridge 
where the Royal Canadian Regiment had been 
held up. Both these battalions lost contact with 
each other and suffered heavy casualties. It was 
accordingly planned to put the 48 Highlanders 
into the attack with a barrage supplied by 
concentrations from Divisional artillery support 
at 1800 hours the following day (25 July).
During the morning of 25 July the position 
in front of us seemed quiet and a troop of 4 
Canadian Recce Regiment (4 Princess Louise 
Dragoon Guards) was able to pass through the 
town and onto the ridge without contacting the 
enemy. It was accordingly felt that the enemy 
had withdrawn. Two patrols were sent out from 
‘C’ Company and they reported back at 1300 
hours that they had found enemy tanks and an 
88 mm gun on this position. It was too late at 
this time to lay on an artillery barrage. The Royal 
Canadian Regiment and Hastings and Prince 
Edward Regiment had both reported the enemy 
on the face of the ridge in caves. Medium machine 
gun fire from the Brigade Support Group was 
thereupon arranged together with artillery 
concentrations and this was directed towards 
the caves. The battalion was ordered to attack at 
1800 hours. In view of the condition of the other 
two battalions, the Royal Canadian Regiment 
and Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, the 
brigade commander ordered that we attack on 
a one company frontage and, as success was 
obtained, the other companies were withheld to 
form a firm base against possible counterattack. 
It was then decided to attack up a defile on the 
left of the position with ‘D’ Company leading who 
were to wheel out and take the high ground to 
the north of the feature which was thought to 
command it. This company was to be followed 
by ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘A’ Companies who were to wheel 
to the right and pass through each other thereby 
allowing ‘A’ Company to lay south of the position. 
The attack went in as ordered with apparently 
little opposition. During the commencement of 
the attack the companies were shelled in the 
forming up areas but without casualties. ‘D’ 
Company reported themselves on their objective 
and ‘B’ Company was then launched in its attack, 
followed by ‘C’ Company. After ‘C’ Company 
had gone into the attack ‘D’ Company reported 
heavy opposition on reaching their objective. All 
of this opposition was found to be on the top 
and reverse slopes of this feature and not on 
the forward slopes as reported by the other two 
battalions. The artillery concentrations were to 
be called down by 18 sets from battalion HQ. 
This communication failed so the artillery fired 
a second concentration on a time plan previously 
agreed upon in the event of such a failure 
occurring. This turned out to be too early as ‘D’ 
A 3-inch mortar crew firing on enemy positions north of Nissoria, 28 July 1943.
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Company had not yet reported on its objective. 
It was then possible to arrange for artillery fire, 
as originally planned, to support ‘B’ Company 
but the concentration in support of ‘C’ was laid 
on twice. ‘C’ Company failed to take the route 
following ‘D’ and ‘B’ Companies so did not make 
contact with ‘B’ Company. After nightfall ‘D’ and 
‘B’ Companies were both out of communication 
with battalion HQ. They had failed to attack their 
objectives and found their positions untenable 
and they both withdrew. ‘C’ Company in the 
meantime had proceeded slowly and laid up after 
being overtaken by darkness until about midnight 
when they attacked towards their objective. They 
found the position closely held by enemy tanks 
in hull down positions and by other machine 
gun fire. At about 0200 hours 26 July, Captain 
Whitelaw, Officer Commanding ‘C’ Company, 
reported to battalion HQ and with the consent of 
the brigade commander was allowed to withdraw 
with little, if any, casualties. The battalion then 
took up its original defensive position where it 
remained during the next two days. 
After AGIRA had been taken (29 July), the 
battalion was ordered on 30 July to move forward 
towards REGALBUTO. During the early hours of 
the morning we moved through NISSORIA and 
AGIRA embussed. We debussed east of AGIRA 
and continued the march forward on foot. From a 
forward observation post the brigade commander 
gave orders for the battalion to take up a position 
on a long ridge just west of the REGALBUTO 
cemetery which was then in the occupation of 
231 Brigade who were under command of 1 
Canadian Division at this time. Since the town of 
REGALBUTO was still in the hands of the enemy 
this approach was across country and there was 
no open road available over which to bring up 
any supporting arms. On arrival on the position 
it was found that two companies of the DORSETS 
were still in possession of this feature and were in 
contact with the enemy immediately to their front. 
Shortly thereafter the two remaining companies 
of the DORSETS who had been in possession of 
the ridge north of REGALBUTO, were forced to 
withdraw into our position. The 48 Highlanders 
then took up position on the south and that 
night the battalion was placed under command 
231 Brigade but the message to this effect had 
never reached me as battalion commander. That 
evening (31 July) ‘C’ Company was in constant 
contact with the enemy. Just before dark the 
battalion received orders to send a strong fighting 
patrol to the high ground about two to three miles 
to the north and ‘D’ Company was dispatched 
to take up this position and to be there before 
dawn, 1 August. On arrival in this position ‘D’ 
Company found the east edge to be held by the 
enemy supported by tanks who were on a low 
plateau to the south of the ridge. Throughout the 
day this company was in constant contact with 
enemy snipers during which it suffered some 
casualties. Throughout that same day ‘A’ and ‘C’ 
Companies had been in contact with the enemy 
who had tanks in the town which engaged them 
with medium machine guns and high explosive 
fire. Although we still had no supporting arms 
the enemy tanks did not actually come forward to 
attack us in our positions. During the following 
night (2 August) the enemy withdrew from the 
town. 
A bulldozer of the 1st Field Company, Royal 
Canadian Engineers cuts a new road across the 
Salso River near Regalbuto, 4 August 1943.
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On the morning of 3 August we sent a small 
patrol into the town which they reported clear 
of enemy and subsequently two companies of 
the DORSETS took the town over. That same 
evening the battalion was ordered to take up a 
position on the same ridge that ‘D’ Company then 
occupied and it did so being in position by first 
light, 4 August. That afternoon the battalion was 
ordered to send a strong patrol to the high ground 
in square 6196 and another patrol forward to 
RIVER SALSO. ‘A’ Company was accordingly 
sent forward to this position and reached it at 
about 2200 hours. At 0200 hours the following 
morning (5 August) the battalion was ordered 
to take up position on the ridge south of the 
REGALBUTO - CARCACI road and to be in 
position by 0700 hours, where we spent the night. 
The following day (6 August) we received orders 
to prepare to cross the RIVER SIMMETO and 
together with the company commanders I spent 
the day on a recce during which we contacted 
78 Division who were on our Divisional right 
flank at CARCACI. On the return trip our party 
came under machine gun fire in the avoidance 
of which our Jeep overturned into the ditch and 
we were obliged to belly-crawl out of the area 
thereby rendering us late for a brigade orders 
group conference. The battalion was ordered to 
send patrols to cross the RIVER SIMETO and to 
be ready on a quarter of an hour’s notice to move 
by transport or on foot to a forming up place and 
to be prepared to form a bridgehead. At dawn (7 
August) the battalion accordingly assembled in 
the ‘A’ Company forward area and prepared to 
move. On receipt of orders to do so the battalion 
crossed the RIVER SALSO after dark, and by a 
very difficult march route arrived in the forming 
up area. The leader of our patrol which had been 
sent forward reported that the enemy were still 
on the other side of the RIVER SIMETO and had, 
in fact, troops on the western bank. This patrol 
was then sent back to cover the recce by the 
engineer recce party and the engineers reported 
that the approach to a bridge in the battalion 
area was impossible. At 0700 hours the following 
morning (7 August) the battalion commander 
ordered another patrol to go out and on arrival 
in the area of CARACI the 78 Division reported 
that the enemy had withdrawn from the eastern 
side of the river. Orders were then received, 
having been brought personally by the Brigade 
Major, Major G.E. Renison, to cross the river in 
the area 1,000 yards north of the aqueduct. On 
approaching the river the battalion was shelled 
and suffered light casualties. The following night 
(8 August) 78 Division attacked ADERNO with a 
heavy barrage of which some shells landed in the 
battalion area but caused no casualties. On the 
following day (9 August) the Division was ordered 
into Army reserve and on 12 August the battalion 
in a brigade move proceeded to its present area 
where we are now resting, re-organizing and 
training for our next campaign.
Canadian soldiers clean up at the end of the Sicillian campaign, near Adrano, 18 August 1943.
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The original of this document can be found at the National 
Archives of Canada, RG 24 Volume 10880.
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